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Quantitative methods are rarely appropriate for research on values in sexuality 
education. Survey research cannot capture the richness, complexity, and depth of 
value questions. It pays no attention to levels of meaning, nuances in language, or 
lived values. Experimental research abstracts values, valuing, and sexuality 
education from their social, institutional, and relational contexts. Experimental 
designs are also undergirded by epistemological assumptions that are difficult to 
reconcile with research on values. 
 
Les méthodes quantitatives sont rarement utiles pour mener à bien des recherches 
sur les valeurs dans le domaine de l'éducation sexuelle. Les sondages ne peuvent 
capter la richesse, la complexité et la profondeur des questions ayant trait aux 
valeurs. Ils ne tiennent pas compte des niveaux de signification, des nuances de 
langage ou des valeurs vécues. La recherche expérimentale extrait les valeurs, les 
jugements de valeur et l'éducation sexuelle de leurs contextes sociaux, institu-
tionnels ou relationnels. Elle repose en outre sur des hypothèses épistémologiques 
qu'il est difficile de concilier avec une recherche axée sur des valeurs. 
 
 
In the sixties and seventies sexuality education was inspired by a positivistic 
paradigm. Teachers, it was argued, should avoid values and teach only those `
`sexual facts which have been established as valid in the scientific community'' 
(Karmel, 1970, p. 95). 
 In the eighties, enthusiasm for this approach began to subside. In Quebec, 
for example, the Ministry of Education's (1985) sexuality education program 
states that: `` because it is linked with the person and with human behaviour, 
because it is the subject of a moral position in every society, because it holds 
the attention of all religions, sex education may not be given without reference 
to values'' (p. 103). Recognizing that sexuality is more than a biological 
phenomenon, and that education is more than just information, sexuality 
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educators throughout North America are now pointing to the importance of 
values (Darling & Mabe, 1989; Desaulniers, 1982; Durand, 1985; Gilgun & 
Gordon, 1983; Gordon, 1981; Kenney & Orr, 1984; Lawlor, Morris, McKay, 
Purcell, & Comeau, 1990; Pegis, Gentles, & de Veber, 1986; Samson, 1979, 
1981; Varcoe, 1988). 
 As a result of this emphasis on values, sexuality education research has 
begun to emphasize value-related areas. Survey research has thrown new light 
on views and perceptions of value issues. Experimental studies have measured 
the impact of sexuality education programs on knowledge, behaviour and 
values. 
 This paper raises issues about the appropriateness and adequacy of surveys 
and experimental studies for research on values in sexuality education. My 
first objective is to highlight the limitations of quantitative methods for 
research on values. Can a quantitative framework provide an adequate picture 
of values? Are its goals and procedures appropriate for research in this area? 
My second objective is to draw attention to methodological issues that have 
yet to be considered in sexuality education. Research in this area is almost 
exclusively quantitative. My third objective is to provide a context for further 
reflection and discussion about the relationship between quantitative and 
qualitative methods in educational research (for example, see Howe, 1988; 
Smith & Heshusius, 1986). 
 But first it is important to clarify how I use the term `` values.'' `` Values” will 
refer to moral values. The term `` moral,'' as Daniel Maguire (1978) argues, `
`means human in the ought or normative sense'' (p. 114). When we say that 
rape is immoral, for example, `` we are saying that it is an inhuman activity; 
that it is not what humans ought to do in expressing their sexuality'' (p. 115). 
Sexual-moral values name what is most human about sexuality (Guindon, 
1989). They are ideals or `` standards of goodness or rightness'' that serve as 
points of reference in evaluation, decision-making or action (Guindon, 1977, 
p. 22). 
 Moral values also represent one's most fundamental convictions. They 
define `` what one will be, instead of merely what one will have'' (Maguire, 
1978, p. 94). As affective appreciations of the good, moral values run deeper 
than attitudes (Samson, 1987). In addition to serving as points of reference, 
they also orient or give meaning to our evaluations, decisions and actions. As 
Maurice Friedman (1984) writes, real living values are `` touchstones of reality'' 
that we carry forward as `` life stances'' (p. 63). 
 
SURVEY RESEARCH AND QUESTIONNAIRES 
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Although sexuality educators increasingly agree on the importance of values, 
some value-related issues remain highly controversial and complex. What 
specific values should underlie or inform a program in sexuality education? 
How should values and value-related areas be discussed in the classroom? 
Should a set of values be presented to students? If so, should these values be 
presented as guidelines or as absolutes that apply to all situations and issues? 
What should be the source of these values? Should sexuality education attempt 
solely to clarify personal values? Should teachers openly indicate to students 
their value preferences? 
 My colleagues and I have designed survey research to study the views and 
perceptions of teachers, parents, and students in the Montreal area on these 
questions (Lawlor et al., 1990; Lawlor & Purcell, 1989a, 1989c; Morris, 1986; 
Purcell, Lawlor, & Morris, 1991). Other researchers have surveyed the views 
and attitudes of Ontario parents (Marsman & Herold, 1986). We have found 
that survey research can make important contributions to value-laden 
classroom practice. Although such research does not settle the issues outlined 
above, it serves as a context for further reflection and discussion. Knowing 
how different groups view and perceive these issues may also help reduce 
tensions, fears, and misunderstandings, legion in sexuality education. 
 Our research to date, however, also indicates that surveys cannot penetrate 
values and value-related issues in all their richness and complexity. In the first 
phase of the research, we distributed a questionnaire to high school teachers of 
sexuality education (Morris, 1986). Some multiple-choice questions dealt with 
general issues in sexuality education, while others dealt specifically with 
values. 
 The teachers in the study responded to the general questions on sexuality 
education without difficulty. They simply checked the appropriate answer. On 
questions dealing with values, however, most teachers specified on the 
questionnaire that they thought it necessary to qualify or to develop further 
their answers. The teachers emphasized that their responses would depend on 
the particular circumstances of the issue or question, and worried that 
statistical data would not catch the nuances and subtleties of their responses. 
These teachers were saying, in other words, that statistical analysis of 
value-rich data may easily become reductionistic. 
 Questionnaires also provide researchers with little information about how 
respondents interpreted the questions. In the second phase of our research, we 
developed a questionnaire for parents (Lawlor & Purcell, 1989b; Purcell, 
Lawlor, & Morris, 1991). One question asked parents what source of values a 
sexuality education program should be based on. A typology developed for the 
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study described: (1) a traditional Judeo-Christian approach based on a literal 
interpretation of the Bible; (2) a modern theological approach that sees 
sexuality as inherently good when expressed in a context of love and 
commitment; (3) practical guidelines drawn from medicine and psychology for 
good mental health, physical well-being and satisfactory interpersonal 
relationships; (4) principles of civil rights (such as a charter of human rights); 
(5) a humanistic philosophy (not based on religion) that emphasizes personal 
growth and relationships. 
 From this question we learned that parents surveyed favoured (in decreas-
ing order) practical guidelines drawn from medicine and psychology, prin-
ciples of civil rights, a humanistic philosophy, and a modern theological 
approach. The traditional religious perspective was the least favoured source 
of values. 
 The responses do not show what meaning parents gave to the question's 
language. This limitation is important in that values are deeply embedded in 
language. For example, how were the words `` traditional'' and `` modern'' 
understood? Some people will see the word `` traditional'' in the first type as 
pejorative, especially since it is followed by a value framework that is said to 
be `` modern.'' Modern, in our culture, usually implies `` more advanced'' or `
`better.'' For some people the word `` humanistic'' carries negative connotations. 
A questionnaire alone cannot probe these different layers of meaning. 
 
SURVEYS AND VALUE RANKING 
 
We identified the value priorities of high school students through value 
ranking (Lawlor & Purcell, 1989a, 1989c), a procedure also used in a 
Canada-wide study of adolescents (Bibby & Posterski, 1985) and in a study of 
the sexual values of Montreal adults (Samson, 1987). 
 Studies using value ranking provide useful information. They may serve, 
for example, as a starting point for the development of a program that takes 
into account the value priorities of teachers, students, and parents. As Samson 
(1987) indicates, this instrument could, in larger comparative studies, identify 
values shared by different communities, cultures, or even countries. 
 The problem with value ranking is that we do not know if the ranking 
shows what respondents value or what they believe should be valued. We do 
not know whether value priorities embody theoretical choices or whether they 
are lived values. 
 Samson (1987) counters these possible criticisms by suggesting that 
ranking forces respondents to differentiate values that might lazily be 
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perceived as identical, and that it best reveals the hierarchical structure of 
value thinking. Forcing the respondents clearly to differentiate and separate 
values, however, may easily become artificial and reductionistic. As Robb 
(1985) indicates, it assumes `` that values must be chosen at the expense of 
others'' (p. 215). Values like `` generosity,'' `` mutuality,'' and `` tenderness'' have 
many interrelated qualities. Forced ranking leaves little room for more 
nuanced or integrative/holistic thinking. 
 Furthermore, consensus in ranking may be misleading. It is not unusual for 
individuals to give different meanings to the same value. Take a value like `
`mutuality,'' for example. One individual might understand mutuality as a form 
of intimacy that comes through fusion. For another, mutuality might mean `
`you scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours.'' A third respondent might see 
mutuality as a form of interindependence, that is, a form of intimacy or sharing 
where one's autonomy and uniqueness is both valued and celebrated (Kegan, 
1982). 
 Discerning differences and similarities in meaning-making is all the more 
critical in a pluralistic society where specific values are likely to have diverse 
meanings. It is also important when one is dealing with different age groups. 
According to psychologist Robert Kegan (1982), there is a developmental 
structure to the meaning people give to their values. Without more explicit 
emphasis on meanings underlying value choices, we have no sense of the 
degree of importance of values chosen, reasons why these values had priority, 
level or depth of valuing, or the extent to which rankings embody a value 
consensus. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES AND ATTITUDINAL SCALES 
ON CLARITY OF VALUES 
 
Experimental studies have been designed to measure sexuality education 
programs' impact on knowledge, behaviour, and values. They have found that 
though school-based programs may successfully increase knowledge, they 
have no `` measurable impact'' on behaviour, and only a `` small impact” on 
values (Kirby, 1980, 1985; Pegis, Gentles, & de Veber, 1986). 
 These findings provide useful information. First, they challenge the view 
that school-based programs lead to an increase in sexual activity (Richert, 
1983; Schlafly, 1983). Second, by placing sexuality education in perspective, 
they may help alleviate the burden teachers are expected to carry, such as 
reducing the rates of teenage pregnancy and incidence of sexually transmitted 
diseases. 
 The problem with experimental research is that it obscures the hidden 
LIMITATIONS OF QUANTITATIVE METHODS 87 
 
 
curriculum, that is, the ways that sexual values are tacitly transmitted and 
learned through language, sex role expectations, the rules and regulations of a 
school, and the various social relationships of that school. Sexual values are 
shaped not only by formal classes on sexuality, but also by `` the interests and 
requirements of social institutions'' (Nelson, 1988, p. 26). Experimental 
research does not uncover the qualities of a value-rich sexuality education. 
What are the attitudes, experiences, processes, and relations that enhance 
sexual-moral valuing? What are the requirements of a meaningful and 
responsible education in human sexuality? These questions are not likely to 
show up in a framework that reduces sexuality education to an object in the 
school curriculum (Moran, 1983, 1987). 
 The measure of values and valuing used in experimental studies is also 
problematic. To determine whether a sexuality education program affected 
students' values, students were given a pretest and posttest questionnaire 
(Kirby 1985; Parcel, Luttman, & Flaherty-Zonis, 1985). This questionnaire, 
consisting of attitudinal scales, asks students to indicate whether their sexual 
values are clear to them, whether it would be easy for them to describe their 
values to someone, and whether they get confused about their values in 
discussions about sexuality. 
 Findings that suggest that a particular program did or did not affect 
perceptions of value clarity do not necessarily indicate that the program did or 
did not affect values. There is more to values and valuing than value clarity, 
especially when the instrument abstracts value clarification from its relational 
context. Are the respondents, for example, able to describe their values in `
`real-life'' discussions, particularly when partners in the discussion hold 
radically different values? If respondents are confused about their values, what 
might be the confusion's source? Does the confusion depend on which 
value-related question is being discussed? Does confusion arise more with 
certain conversational partners than with others (e.g., with parents versus 
peers)? What these instruments measure, in other words, are hypothetical 
perceptions of value clarity. They say very little about valuing itself. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFICULTIES AND PRESUPPOSITIONS 
OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 
 
My criticism of experimental research will be controversial. The present 
research trend in sexuality education is toward more experimental studies 
(George & Behrendt, 1985). Only rigorously controlled experimental studies, 
it is argued, will produce `` hard data,'' ensure objectivity and neutrality, allow 
valid predictions, and establish causality (Jayne, 1986; Kelly, 1985, 1988; 
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Kirby, 1985). 
 I would respond that researchers in sexuality education have too readily and 
uncritically accepted the positivistic assumption that the methods and goals of 
the natural sciences can be applied to the human and social sciences. Notions 
like causality and prediction presuppose that there is such a thing as an 
objective human nature and society that follows formal laws akin to the laws 
of physical or material nature (Bernstein, 1985, pp. 8–20; Jagger, 1983, pp. 
353–389). 
 Epistemologically, this view rests on a correspondence theory of truth, 
which suggests that reality or truth is known `` out there'' and `` in itself,'' 
independent of the subject. What is real or true, according to this view, is 
known in the same way a mirror reflects objects (Rorty, 1979). 
 Human beings, unlike physical or material phenomena, mediate their 
experience and understanding with meaning. Humans define themselves and 
interpret their experience through dialogue, symbols, rituals, and storytelling. 
A research method that strips sexuality, education and valuing of the ways in 
which persons construct meaning will have little to say about the `` specifically 
human aspects of sexual experience'' (Guindon, 1989, p. 8). Such a method 
perverts sexual language (Guindon, 1977; Lafortune, 1989), and will produce 
results `` inapplicable to real-life issues'' (Guindon, 1989, p. 9). 
 From an ontological perspective, the view that experimental procedures 
will immunize the researcher against bias, ideology, and value judgments 
assumes that researchers can deliberately abstract themselves from their own 
history and meaning-making, and that there exists an `` archimedian point'' 
outside of history where one can be free of subjectivity, bias, and prejudice 
(Bernstein, 1985). It fails to recognize that data in the human and social 
sciences are mediated by the subjectivity, historical context, and language of 
both the researcher and the research subject. As Gadamer (1975) argues, `` the 
standpoint that is beyond any standpoint, a standpoint from which we could 
conceive its true identity, is a pure illusion'' (p. 339). We enter a world that is 
already pre-interpreted in language. Language mediates our values, and the 
place outside of language does not exist (Gadamer, 1976). 
 From an ethical perspective, the commitment to value-neutrality in 
unacceptable because it leaves potentially insidious values unexamined. In 
Reflections on Gender and Science (1985), Keller argues that references to 
objective data as `` brute'' or `` hard'' (as opposed to `` soft'') reveal a masculinist 
bias. When we dub objective science as `` hard'' as opposed to the softer (that is, 
more subjective) branches of knowledge, we implicitly invoke a sexual 
metaphor, in which `` hard'' is of course masculine and `` soft'' feminine. A 
woman who thinks `` scientifically or objectively is thinking `like a man'; 
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conversely, a man pursuing a nonrational argument is arguing `like a woman''' 
(p. 77). 
 Ethicist James Nelson (1988) believes the prizing of hard over soft shows a 
`` phallic interpretation of reality'' (p. 90). Such an interpretation projects upon 
the world values about size, hardness, up-ness, linearity, and externality. These 
take precedence over values relating to the internal, `` the cyclical, the 
horizontal, and the soft'' (p. 90). 
  The doctrine of value-freedom and neutrality played an important role in 
the history of the social sciences. Originally it liberated and emancipated 
(Gouldner, 1962). It `` established a breathing space'' and encouraged `` a 
temporary suspension of the moralizing reflexes built into the sociologist by 
his own society'' (p. 204). It does not follow however, that social sciences 
should abstain from all value-judgments, a position Barry (1979) calls `` a 
declaration of non-responsibility'' (p. 264). As Gouldner notes, the commit-
ment to value-freedom and neutrality `` had a paradoxical potentiality: it might 
enable [persons] to make better value judgments rather than none'' (pp. 203–
204). 
 It is ironic that sexuality education research favours a methodology whose 
language may perpetuate insidious sexual values. It is even more ironic that 
this methodology is modelled after an understanding of the natural sciences 
that is being rejected by researchers in the natural sciences. 
 Recent developments in philosophy of science have shown how the issues 
discussed above also apply to the natural sciences. This work was spearheaded 
by Thomas Kuhn (1970), who outlined how scientific theories are based on 
traditions of research that condition the selection of research topics and 
interpretation of data. More recently, Mary Hesse (1980) has argued that data 
in both natural and social sciences are `` not detachable from theory, for what 
count as data are determined in light of some theoretical interpretation, and the 
facts themselves have to be reconstructed in light of interpretation'' (p. 171). 
According to Hesse, all science—whether natural or social—`` is irreducibly 
metaphorical and inexact . . .'' (p. 172). 
 In modern physics conviction is growing that the physicist not only 
observes the properties of atomic phenomena but participates in their creation. 
Rejecting the `` sharp Cartesian division between mind and matter, between the 
observer and the observed,'' physicists are asserting that `` we can never speak 
about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves. . . . The 
patterns scientists observe in nature are intimately connected with the patterns 
of their mind; with their concepts, thoughts, and values'' (Capra, 1983, pp. 86–
87). 
 From this perspective, the epistemological challenge of all research, and 
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particularly of research on a value-rich area, is not a denial of subjectivity or `
`cool objectivity, but a clarity and honesty about where we begin'' (Zullo & 
Whitehead, 1983, p. 20). As sociologist Karl Manheim has said: 
 
A clear and explicit avowal of the implicit metaphysical presuppositions that 
underlie and make possible empirical knowledge will do more for the clarification 
and advancement of research than a verbal denial of the existence of these 
presuppositions accompanied by their surreptitious admission through the back 
door. (cited in Lyon, 1983, p. 181) 
 
 Implicit value commitments are inaccessible to criticism and thereby 
subject to ideology. The quest for scientific objectivity, `` belies its own aims, 
subverting both the meaning and potential of objective inquiry'' (Keller, 1985, 
p. 12; see also Maguire, 1978, p. 180). Researchers must admit, clarify and 
criticize their own fundamental value presuppositions if their findings and 
conclusions are to become more objective. In other words, authentic 
subjectivity is genuine objectivity (Conn, 1981; Peshkin, 1988). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The current emphasis on values in sexuality education increases the need for 
research in this area. Researchers, however, must begin to consider possibil-
ities other than surveys and experimental designs. Surveys' quantitative 
instruments can show only the external face of values, not the richness, depth 
and complexity of real living values. 
 Experimental research reduces sexuality education to an object in the 
school curriculum, and reduces valuing to hypothetical perceptions of value 
clarity. Having adopted the goals and procedures of a science that deals with 
non-human objects and material phenomena, experimental research obscures 
the ways in which persons imbue their sexuality and valuing with meaning. 
Both surveys and experimental designs demean and decontextualize an area of 
human experience organically linked to meaning-making and irreducibly 
context dependent. As Mishler (1979) writes: 
 
Science is neither a cure nor a palliative for alienation. Nonetheless, it need not 
add to other alienating forces in the society. A better fit between our research 
methods and our phenomena of interest, the context dependence of human 
meaning and action, might be one step toward a nonalienating science. (p. 18) 
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